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Urbanization and scarce income-earning opportunities have led to increasing commercialization 
of non-timber forest products in southern Africa, including the nutritious mopane worm Imbrasia 
(=Gonimbrasia) belina. The mopane worm contributes substantially to incomes and food security 
in households across the region, but little research has addressed its use within South Africa. 
Using semi-structured interviews with harvesters and resource managers, this paper compares 
the management of mopane worm resources under public, private, and communal governance 
systems to explore the ability of each to provide users with sustainable access to the resource. 
Results show that governance is weaker in the communal property regime compared to the 
public and private property regimes. Weak control over access and high demand for mopane 
worms in urban and rural centres may be leading to a concentration of harvesting pressures in 
communally managed areas, increasing competition for a resource already scarce after years of 
drought and land-use change.
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1. Introduction
Significant numbers of people around the world depend on woodland resources for their livelihoods, 
welfare, income, preservation of local cultures and spirituality (Heubach et al. 2011, Shackleton and 
Pandey 2014, Pandey et al. 2016). Indeed, harvesting woodland resources in southern Africa can garner 
rural households financial returns comparable to remuneration earned from local agriculture (Dovie et al. 
2002), while urbanization and rising unemployment have led to the growing demand for low-cost forest 
products among the urban poor (Chidumayo and Marunda 2010).
Mopane worms are an important NTFP throughout their range in southern Africa and support an increasing 
rural and urban-based trade (Illgner and Nel 2000, Kozanayi and Frost 2002). They are an important source 
of protein, with consumption contributing significantly to food security for poor households (Dovie et al. 
2002, Stack et al. 2003, Madibela et al. 2009). During the outbreak season, rural harvesters collect, clean and 
dry mopane worms for household consumption, trading and bartering (Illgner and Nel 2000, Gondo et al. 
2010). As a key rural industry, mopane worm commercialization provides an important income source for 
households either through formal or informal trade (Kozanayi and Frost 2002), with harvesters and traders 
using profits for buying farm inputs, household provisions, paying school fees and health care (Stack et al. 
2003; Thomas 2013).
Mopane worm harvesters presently trade over 80% of their yield, whereas it was once common for 
harvesters to collect mopane worms for home use and reciprocal bartering only (Stack et al. 2003, Gondo 
et al. 2010). In Botswana alone, the industry employs an estimated 10,000 people annually (Shackleton and 
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Gumbo 2010). Households attach importance to income from the mopane worm trade because the harvest 
occurs during the ‘hungry season’- between agricultural harvests and just before the school year begins, 
when demand for cash to pay for school fees and uniforms is high (Stack et al. 2003). The regional trade 
of mopane worms has also flourished, with the cross-border trade between Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe valued between R422 million and R638 million per year (Makhado et al. 2014).
Despite the importance of mopane worms in regional livelihoods, little is known about their governance. 
Recent decades have seen a high and growing demand for the worms, and concerns about the possible 
decline of this resource underscore the importance of understanding the different governance regimes that 
may influence use (Thomas 2013). The centrality of governance is highlighted by cases throughout the 
world where NTFP use and trade is often characterised by poor management and over-regulation, with 
concomitant concerns linked to corruption, unsustainable use, and harvester exploitation (Belcher and 
Schreckenberg 2007; Laird et al. 2010).
Through exploring the governance of mopane worms under three different property regimes in Limpopo 
Province, South Africa – public, private, and communal – and by comparing harvesting practices and access 
across these regimes, the paper aims to address this research gap and to explain the factors that increase 
the likelihood of successful resource management under different regimes (Cousins 1995, Ainslie 1999, 
Ostrom et al. 1999, Ostrom 2009). Within the context of increasing demand and trade and environmental 
change, the paper also aims to understand the possible impacts of increasing commercialization – both for 
the resource and for livelihoods. In doing so, the paper aims to provide evidence of the relative effectiveness 
of governance approaches within each of the regimes to sustainably manage the use of mopane worm 
resources.
1.1. Mopane worm life cycle
The caterpillars of the emperor moth, Imbrasia (=Gonimbrasia) belina (Lepidoptera: Saturniidae) are 
colloquially known as mopane worms (Makhado et al. 2009) because they feed almost exclusively on 
the mopane tree, Colophospermum mopane. At the commencement of the outbreak season, adult moths 
oviposit single clusters of between 30–300 or more eggs on the leaves and twigs of the mopane tree 
(Ditlhogo et al. 1996) (see Figure 1). A six-week larval stage follows the egg-laying period. The larvae 
will pass through five instars before harvesting in December/January and April/May, which is followed 
by pupation to mark the end of the season (Ditlhogo et al. 1996). The instar I to III larvae are known 
to forage together in combinations of about 20–200 individuals to counter predation pressure, regulate 
body temperature and reduce water loss (Frears et al. 1999, Klok and Chown 1999). The instar IV larvae 
become increasingly solitary and prepare for pupation underground (Klok and Chown 1999). Harvesting 
of mopane worms is more desirable during the instar V. This is due to the minimal effort needed for 
degutting as the caterpillars have little to no plant matter in their digestive tracts and have reached 
maximum growth (Stack et al. 2003). However, harvesters are increasingly targeting the instar III and 
IV caterpillars, due to increasing competition among harvesters and inexperience by novice harvesters 
(Gondo 2001, Lucas 2011, Thomas 2013). Mopane worms are bivoltine (producing two generations per 
rainy season), while in more arid regions such as Namibia they are univoltine (Ditlhogo et al. 1996, 
Thomas 2013). Nonetheless, rainfall and other climatic factors are known to play a critical role in 
triggering the emergence of the egg-laying moth and the survival of the caterpillar from hatching to 
pupation.
1.2. Overview of property regimes
Within the study area, privately-owned land takes many forms, but most of these areas are associated with 
livestock or game farms. In this property regime, individuals or families own land and can voluntarily 
transfer it through sale to another party. Property owners have the right to exclude others from the use of 
resources on their land.
Under a public property regime, the state manages land and its resources for specific purposes on behalf of 
its citizens. Administering authorities typically restrict the individual use of resources. For example, within 
state forests, provincial nature reserves, or national parks, some types of resource use, such as the collection 
of thatch, fruit, or medicinal plants, may be allowed on a limited basis and in restricted areas. Other resource 
uses, such as hunting, may be forbidden. Public lands in Limpopo Province primarily consist of state forests, 
provincial nature reserves, or national parks.
In communal property regimes, the state holds land in trust for specific tribal groups, and a chief 
or headman allocates this land for use by members of that group (Lahiff 2000). The chief acts as the 
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custodian of common resources for the communal area, and although many Chiefs will consult their 
communities on important matters, decision-making power rests with the tribal authority (Claassens 
2001). Once allocated, land can be used by a household or transferred to another member of the 
household with permission from the tribal authority, but usually cannot be sold (Lahiff 2000). Customary 
law in southern Africa has historically played a role in regulating the use and management of communal 
resources such as grazing land and marula fruit harvesting, with varying degrees of success (Wynberg and 
Laird 2007). In this study, the communal areas were found primarily within the former homeland areas 
of South Africa and were administered at the local level by tribal authorities, e.g. a chief or VhaMusanda 
(headman).
2. Study Area
The study was conducted across nine sites in Limpopo Province – Dzumeri, Ha Gumbu, Makhuva, Masisi, 
Matiyani, Mopane, Mphambo, Nkomo, Zwigodini and Thohoyandou. Figure 2 shows the location of the 
interview sites within the study area. These sites are located within Vhembe and Mopani districts in north-
eastern Limpopo Province, South Africa. This area, which borders Zimbabwe in the north and Kruger 
National Park (KNP) in the east, contains one of South Africa’s main mopane worm harvesting regions 
(Makhado et al. 2014). Research sites were selected based on the extent of mopane worm harvesting; this 
was determined through preliminary site visits in Thohoyandou, Malamulele and Giyani towns. Sites were 
selected to compare governance and access norms of the mopane worm harvest under private, public, and 
communal property rights regimes.
Figure 1: Mopane worm life cycle.
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The existence of multiple types of governance in the study area and other parts of South Africa is directly 
linked to the apartheid era Bantu homeland system. This system was created under the auspices of the 
Bantu Authorities Act (1951) and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959) for self-regulation 
along tribal lines (Heffernan 2017). The study area includes part of the former Venda State and Gazankulu 
Homeland. Traditional leadership played a central role in the formation and governance of these homelands, 
effectively co-opted to police the citizens in their jurisdictions (see Mashele 2004, Khunou 2009). The 
Venda, Gazankulu homeland and others were later amalgamated into former Northern Transvaal province 
(later renamed Limpopo Province) in 1994. The collaboration of traditional leaders with the apartheid state 
in the oppression of black people has over time eroded the respect which the institution of traditional 
leadership had historically enjoyed (Mashele 2004). As a result of the decades-long policies of parallel 
development, these former homeland regions remain underdeveloped with limited economic activities 
and high dependence on NTFPs as a household coping strategy (Paumgarten and Shackleton 2011). Other 
socioeconomic dynamics, such as circular migration (rural to urban and urban to rural) provide an important 
coping strategy for households in these regions (Collinson et al. 2006).
3. Methods
Two sets of semi-structured interviews were conducted with harvesters and other key informants in 2016 
and 2017. Over these periods, 45 harvesters and 8 land managers were interviewed (Table 1), including 
33 harvesters and four community leaders (village heads and chiefs) in communal areas. Ten harvesters 
and three landowners were interviewed from privately owned areas. In the publicly owned areas of the 
Kruger National Park, two harvesters and one conservation official were interviewed. These areas and 
informants were identified using a nonprobability sampling approach.
Harvesters and other key informants were identified and selected through snowball sampling across the 
three property regimes, with each asked to suggest other potential informants for the study. This method 
Figure 2: Location of study sites in Limpopo Province, South Africa.
Table 1: Surveyed participants in each property regime and the role they play in the mopane worm harvest.
Public Private Communal Total
Harvesters 2 10 33 45
Managers 1 3 4 8
Sekonya et al: New Pressures, Old Foodways 143
is useful when working with remote or widely dispersed populations that would otherwise be unknown to 
the researcher. In most cases, authority figures at the village level assisted in identifying initial informants. 
The informants provided information on their livelihoods, harvesting practices and rules; perceptions of 
environmental change; governance and access to mopane worms; the impact of perceived changes on future 
outbreaks; and the availability of mopane worms. Interviews were conducted in Xitsonga, Tshivenda and 
English with the assistance of translators. These were transcribed and coded by hand. Thematic analysis was 
undertaken iteratively with data collection. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents prior to 
commencing the interviews, and the anonymity of all informants was strictly maintained. Ethics approval 
was obtained from the University of Cape Town prior to the research commencing.
4. Results
Across the three tenurial regimes, a plethora of rules, regulations and management objectives regulate the 
access, use and management of mopane worm resources. Table 2 below presents an overview of the access 
and management rules across the three regimes in the study area.
4.1. Communal property regime
4.1.1. Customary rule subversion
Communal areas were located primarily within the former Venda and Gazankulu homeland areas and are 
administered locally by tribal authorities, usually led by VhaMusanda.1 These authorities play a vital role in 
regulating the mopane worm harvest in communal areas. In general, there is little direct monitoring of the 
 1 Vhamusanda is a Tshivenda word for a village headman.




Access open for locals. Nonlocals 
require permission from the chief
An access fee of R300 
charged per person per 
season
Access limited only to selected 
authorised harvesters
Harvesters discouraged from 
camping
Camping only permitted 
in designated areas on the 
property




No limitation on harvest 
quantities
There is no limit on harvest 
quantities
Harvesters are allowed to harvest 
as much mopane worms as they 
can in a four-hour window per day
Harvesters discouraged from 
harvesting juvenile caterpillars. 
Digging pupae is a taboo
No harvesting of juvenile 
caterpillars or digging 
pupae allowed
No harvesting of juvenile 
caterpillars or digging pupae 
allowed
No harvesting till chief declares 
the commencement of harvesting 
season
No harvesting till 
landowners declare the 
commencement
No harvesting till park managers 
declare the commencement
No harvesting till mopane worm 
reaches maturity
Harvesting only permitted 
in instar V
Harvesting only permitted in 
instar V
Harvesters encouraged to not to 
break branches or trees
No tree climbing or 
breaking branches allowed
Harvesters not allowed to break 
branches or climb trees
Management Fires discouraged Fires are only permitted 
at the camps or provided 
accommodation areas
All fires strictly prohibited
Tribal police and ordinary 
villagers constantly monitor any 
unauthorised harvesting
Patrols conducted for 
security enforcement
Inspection of all harvesters on 
entering and exiting the park
Enforcement 
and fines
Fines and confiscation of harvest Immediate confiscation 
of harvest. Expulsion and 
blacklisting
Immediate expulsion. In the 
case of poaching, prosecution
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mopane worm harvest, but the chief calls a meeting of the tribal council and selects a date for the official 
start of the harvesting period. This usually takes place in the weeks following both Christmas and Easter, 
depending on the presence of an outbreak.
There appeared to be consensus regarding how the caterpillars should be harvested. Nearly all informants 
stated that caterpillars should not be harvested until they reach a particular size and that harvesters should 
not damage mopane trees. People harvesting in communal areas where they are not residents were expected 
to get permission from the traditional authorities before harvest commenced. However, harvesters did not 
uniformly follow these norms. In practice, people from outside the community rarely requested permission 
from tribal authorities. Reports from all communally managed areas surveyed suggested large numbers 
of outsiders coming from far away – Giyani, Polokwane, Thohoyandou, Johannesburg, or from villages 
nearby – parking their cars in the bush and beginning harvesting without making their presence known to 
VhaMusanda. One harvester commented:
“These other people who are not from here come in big numbers using buses and harvest the 
worms, sometimes without first going to the chief for permission. They break the trees when they 
harvest, and they do not follow any of our established harvesting practices.” Female harvester, 28
This view was shared by other local people, who felt that the influx of harvesters from the cities and other 
distant areas harmed mopane worm populations in their village. Most harvesters cited the failure by the 
non-local harvesters to observe certain local customary practices and established norms as the key drivers 
of population decline. One Chief commented:
“Nothing that is affecting the outbreak pattern is coming from the community. People from the 
outside harvest the small mopane worms and this might prevent the next outbreak. The community 
alone could not finish an outbreak.” Male Chief, 82
However, few harvesters followed the rules even within their communities. While the mopane worm 
harvest should begin after the chief has announced open season, only eight of the 33 harvesters in 
communal areas said they waited for the announcement, despite three of the four community leaders 
stating that harvesters waited for the announcement. This may be an indication of the covert rule-breaking 
by harvesters. Most harvesters said they either chose their starting day based on the size of the mopane 
worms or by coordinating with other harvesters or family members, whether or not the announcement 
had been made. Only ten out of 33 harvesters felt that harvesting norms were consistently followed. The 
view was that competition is fierce, and that those who follow the rules too closely may run the risk of 
finding the harvest finished before they arrive. The comment below illustrates the growing trend among 
harvesters to subvert their own communal rules due to the increasing competition for mopane worms:
“This year, people are harvesting before the announcement. They do this at their own risk. If you 
wait for the announcement, though, you might get nothing, and prices (for mopane worms) are 
remarkably high.” Female harvester, 28
4.1.2. Ineffective rule enforcement
Amidst this environment of pervasive rule-breaking, there was substantial ambiguity about who was 
responsible for enforcing harvesting norms, with harvesters suggesting that tribal authorities (18 out of 
33), government rangers (seven out of 33) and harvesters themselves (six out of 33) were involved in 
enforcement. Almost a third of harvesters (ten out of 33) indicated that no one enforced the rules and that 
harvesting mostly took place in an open-access system. Many of the harvesters indicated that they did not 
feel empowered to participate in changing these rules. Despite the low levels of following rules and a lack 
of broad consensus on how harvesters might participate in shaping rules, all informants reported that they 
found the rules governing the harvest to be fair.
Changes to land cover due to vegetation clearing and the over-exploitation of mopane worms were 
common narratives in the communal regime. Settlement encroachment in communal areas was reported 
by eight of 33 harvesters. While 19 of 33 harvesters noted clearing to some degree, more than half of 
the informants reported moderate to substantial changes. The informants indicated a strong connection 
between the protection of mopane trees and future mopane worm harvest. The need for protection of 
mopane worms was particularly strong, where 24 out of 33 harvesters and all four community leaders 
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mentioned the importance of protecting mopane trees to secure future access to mopane worms. Some 
informants proposed an increase in the number of rangers to be deployed in the forests.
4.2. Private property regime
4.2.1. Access negotiation
Common land uses from the private property regime were associated with livestock or game farms. In 
general, farms were fenced, giving landowners and managers a high degree of control over resource access. 
Harvesters wishing to access mopane worms on private land required permission from the property owners 
and generally paid an access fee averaging R200–300 (US$ 13–202) per season; overnighting was typically 
permitted on the farms during the harvest only at designated areas. This allowed harvesters to avoid the 
costly daily commute between their homes and farms. Importantly, it was also an indication of the rapport 
and trust developed between private landowners and the harvesters.
Landowners have increasingly restricted access to mopane worm harvesters in recent years. The manager of 
one game farm, whose father had managed the same farm, remembered a time when 50–60 harvesters had 
been allowed to harvest each year, as opposed to the eight who currently harvest. He noted that in the past, 
landowners encouraged people to harvest mopane worms on their land to control the caterpillars. This was 
linked to a belief that caterpillars would reduce the available forage for their game animals. Commenting on 
motivations for access restrictions, and on how shifts in perceptions had shaped management approaches, 
the farm manager stated:
“The previous owner thought mopane worms would eat all the leaves and not leave any for the 
game, so he wanted harvesters to take the mopane worms. The new owner thinks that mopane 
worm harvesting is bad and harmful to the environment.” Male farm manager, 55
4.2.2. Adherence to access and harvest rules
Only harvesters that had successfully negotiated access could enter the private farms for harvesting. Such 
negotiation included a variable payment per person for a given number of days. Harvesters were permitted 
to stay on the farm for an agreed period and could harvest as many mopane worms as they wished. In rare 
cases, the harvested quantity was limited, ordinarily counted in a number of ‘maize meal’ bags or 20-litre 
containers. Nonconformity to these terms resulted in transgressors being expelled from the farms. In some 
instances, such transgressors were not granted future access. If possible, farm owners gave preference to 
harvesters with whom they had good relationships and had worked well in the past. Unauthorized access 
to the farms often resulted in a prosecution for trespassing.
The management approach adopted by the private landowners included the banning of mopane tree 
felling and close monitoring of the outbreaks and harvesting to ensure that only instar IV and V caterpillars 
were harvested. This aimed to maximize harvest quantities without compromising the subsequent years’ 
outbreaks by preserving habitat integrity. The effectiveness of these measures was evident as the harvesters 
preferred harvesting in the private and public lands as they were more likely to collect larger volumes. 
The landowners also determined the commencement and end of the season. This control feature was 
shared across the private and public tenure types. This management precaution prevented the harvesting 
of juvenile or burrowing worms and the digging out of pupae. This was done by closely monitoring the 
caterpillar development and the harvesting season as it progresses.
Harvesters reported no settlement encroachment and low levels of selective mopane tree cutting. Five out 
of ten harvesters interviewed believed that harvesting had a negligible impact on mopane worm populations, 
and that heat and drought were the main factors impacting outbreaks.
4.2.3. Balancing harvesting with management objectives
All informants within this regime believed that authority to make harvesting rules was vested entirely with 
landowners and that there was no scope for harvesters to participate in shaping these rules. All felt that 
landowners and their employees had the responsibility to enforce harvesting rules, and none believed that 
the government had any role to play in regulating the harvest on private land.
Linked to a shift from livestock to wildlife management over the past two decades, landowners now want 
mopane worms on their land, as they believe that defoliation of the mopane tree can increase the nutritional 
quality of the second flush of leaves, creating better forage for wildlife mammals.
 2 At the exchange rate 1 ZAR = US$ 0.065.
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“The white farmers do not let people harvest because they say the mopane worms must eat the old 
leaves so the game can eat the new leaves. The old leaves can make animals sick; they have some 
kind of poison in them.” Male farm employee, 55
However, for the wildlife game reserves, a fear of game poaching has also strengthened the desire of 
private landowners to maintain tight control over access to their land. Many harvesters reported that 
managers restricted men from harvesting mopane worms on private lands due to a fear of game theft. This 
view was echoed by one harvester who said:
“Only women can go into game farms because men might bring snares and steal game. Men 
are suspected of poaching in game farms, so they would have to harvest secretly there.” Female 
 harvester, 61
Overall, only one harvester out of ten found the current system unfairly restrictive, whereas others 
accepted the conditions of access, provided the mopane worm outbreak was plentiful, and they were not 
given a limit to the amount they could harvest. All informants reported that in general, people followed 
the harvesting rules.
4.3. Public property regime
Extractive resource use in national parks is prohibited in South Africa. However, in 2010 KNP began 
piloting the Kruger Park Mopane Worm Harvesting Programme. KNP remains the only national park to 
sanction the harvest of mopane worms within its boundaries. As part of the KNP program, harvesting takes 
place under close monitoring and is only allowed in a four-hectare resource harvesting zone alongside the 
fence on the western edge of the park. Some of the harvesters hinted that limited harvesting also takes 
place at Letaba Ranch, a smaller provincially managed nature reserve. However, harvesting in this reserve 
was erratic and inconsistent, and as a result, none of the harvesters used Letaba Ranch reliably.
4.3.1. Access coordination
Each harvesting season, section rangers working in KNP evaluate the size of the outbreak to determine if 
it is sufficient to allow harvesting. If so, KNP staff hold a forum with community representatives bordering 
the park. The forum selects seven villages that will be allowed to participate in the harvest that season. 
Each participating village may send ten harvesters who are chosen internally by the village, often by the 
traditional authorities. South African National Parks (SANParks) recommends that those benefitting from 
the program should be the poorest in the community but is not involved in the decision-making process. 
The rules for the harvest are spelt out clearly in the forum: harvesters must take worms above a certain size, 
must provide their transportation that meets certain requirements, and must not damage or bend trees. 
Otherwise, they may collect as much as they like within their allotted time. Two armed rangers are always 
present to monitor harvesting activities and to protect harvesters from wild animals.
Two years after it began, KNP temporarily suspended the mopane worm harvest due to drought conditions 
in the park. Because of the program’s short duration, only 140 harvesters had participated in the initiative 
up until December 2012, suggesting that in terms of broader patterns of resource access and use, harvesting 
on public lands is inconsequential.
4.3.2. Unambiguous access and harvesting rules
In many respects, governance of the mopane worm harvest in the public property regime resembled that 
of the private property regime. Harvesters found the system fair despite a lack of meaningful avenues for 
participating in the rule-making process. Managers and harvesters established a clear consensus around 
harvesting rules and how they were to be enforced. SANParks officials noted that rules were closely followed, 
most likely because if any individual broke the rules, the entire harvesting initiative would be terminated 
for all villages. Perceptions of environmental change were similar to the private property regime, with low 
levels of reported tree cutting and land-use change indicating robust compliance and resource governance 
in this system.
Access to the State-managed public land is strictly controlled. Currently, KNP is the only national park 
area to permit controlled harvesting of mopane worms under the following conditions: (a) Only authorised 
harvesters are allowed access. These are selected from the neighbouring communities, and poorer 
households get prioritised; (b) Harvesters are accompanied by a ranger for protection and monitoring; (c) No 
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overnight camping is allowed; (d) Harvesters are allowed to harvest as much mopane worms as they can 
within a four-hour window; (e) Any transgression results in immediate exclusion from the park. In the 
case of unauthorised access, transgressors face prosecution. Similarly, other smaller provincially-controlled 
nature reserves also permit mopane worm harvesting on terms which mirror that of KNP. Nonetheless, 
access and harvesting rules are monitored to ensure adherence to the rules and to detect any transgressors. 
One harvester mentioned:
“At Letaba Ranch they make people wait until mopane worms are big enough to harvest. They limit 
the harvesters to 7 people per vehicle and a maximum of 20 vehicles. Rangers check bags at the end 
of the day to make sure they are not taking the small ones.” Male harvester, unknown age
Some local villagers still managed to gain unsanctioned access to the nature reserves to harvest. One 
harvester remarked:
“The mopane worms in Letaba Ranch were more protected. Nevertheless people still jump the fence 
and take them. The electric fence was not working properly.” Male harvester, unknown age
5. Discussion
5.1. Resource access
Ribot and Peluso (2003) describe in their seminal work that the ability to access and benefit from a resource 
depends on a bundle of different power relationships, including among others access to knowledge, capital, 
authority, and identity. They further explain how governance systems privilege certain mechanisms of 
access over others through their institutions, rules, and norms. These analyses resonate with the findings 
of this study. The relative ease of access to mopane worm resources under the communal property regime 
means that a substantial proportion of mopane worm harvesting takes place in these areas as opposed to 
those under private and public management. For urban residents or migrant harvesters looking to make an 
income from mopane worms, harvesting without paying a fee and with negligible consequences associated 
with breaking the rules holds an obvious attraction. This in turn, also results in resource overexploitation. 
These findings resonate with similar studies in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe revealing how vulnerable 
‘outsider’ groups such as migrants or economic refugees would travel substantial distances to access 
mopane worms in communal areas with a loose regulatory climate (Stack et al. 2003, Lucas 2011, Thomas 
2013). Similar trends were observed in communal tilapiine cichlids-based fisheries in Lake Liambezi of 
Namibia, where nonlocal businessmen hired Zambian fishers to fish for them for quick profits in complete 
disregard for locally agreed rules on resource sustainability and resident fishers (Tweddle et al. 2015). As 
an example of the export of wealth for the benefit of these businessmen and migrant fishers, the fish from 
Lake Liambezi were marketed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) via Zambia (Tweddle et al. 2015).
Of all three regimes, access to mopane worms in the communal areas was least controlled, with evidence 
suggesting that the enforcement of existing access mechanisms was ineffective to deter transgressors. The 
inefficiency of these measures was worsened by poor adherence to established customary norms due to 
unprecedented social change and urban influx. This is in part due to the tainted legacy of traditional leaders 
during apartheid which, together with their declining influence, continues to undermine their authority 
within communal areas (Mashele 2004). As a result, asserting customary control, setting rules and enforcing 
them over resources has increasingly become a challenge for traditional leaders. However, for resource 
users living in these areas, harvesting within the community is also more convenient and cost-effective than 
accessing mopane worms on private or public property. In this case, pressures such as uncontrolled access 
and habitat destruction from local and non-local harvesters could lead to resource degradation and reduced 
availability of the mopane worm. Such degradation may occur when common property systems break down 
(Cousins, 1995) or when resource use increases to the point that customary approaches are no longer 
appropriate for the level of commercialisation (Wynberg and Laird, 2007). The inability of tribal authorities 
to enforce existing resource management rules further indicates weak governance in communally managed 
areas (Ainslie 1999), which inadvertently creates an institutional control vacuum (Shackleton 2009). This 
breakdown in institutions extends beyond the village and communal area limits. As Bromley (2008) notes, 
it is crucial to go beyond the usual free riding, shirking, theft and resource degradation narratives that often 
dominate the commons literature. By focusing more carefully on the institutional isolation of the African 
commons, it becomes evident that external forces play a more significant role. Such structural issues may 
include the diminished ability of resource users to respond adequately to impending resource degradation; 
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disproportionate and skewed access to resources; unsuitable policy frameworks; and historical spatial 
patterns in communal regions (Beinart 2000, King 2011, Palmer and Bennett 2013, Vetter 2013).
In private and publicly managed areas, more effective access mechanisms such as strict sanctioning of 
harvesters; use of access fees; and, harvester patrols and inspections likely prevented damage to the mopane 
worm resource. Access under these regimes was costlier and less flexible; harvesters without the necessary 
capital, transportation and social relationships were unable to access this important source of cash income 
and nutritious food.
5.2. Resource degradation and perceptions of environmental change
Historically, traditional management systems based on traditional ecological knowledge likely ensured the 
sustainable use of mopane worms. In Zambia, for example, the knowledge of indigenous Bisa was crucial for 
the management and utilization of edible caterpillar species (Mbata et al. 2002). This involved monitoring 
the resource, protecting early life stages, conserving habitat, and applying harvesting restrictions through 
socially embedded customary practices, rules, and beliefs (Mbata et al. 2002). However, as revealed in this 
study, as customary systems have eroded, and commercialisation has increased, communal areas have 
seemingly become less controlled with associated resource degradation.
Evidence from this study suggests that existing regulatory mechanisms are ineffective to sufficiently 
deter transgressors and that tribal authorities are resorting to using ‘tribal police’ to patrol forests to 
monitor any premature harvesting, tree clearing and the presence of non-local harvesters. The inefficiency 
of these measures is worsened by poor adherence to established customary norms due to unprecedented 
social change and urban influx, poor access regulation and inadequate rule enforcement. In contrast, the 
governance of public and private lands has led to high levels of control over resource access, and seemingly 
more effective mopane conservation. Similar studies on mopane worm governance in communal areas in 
Namibia have demonstrated that institutional coordination and stricter controls on access and monitoring 
are critical for mopane worm population sustainability (Thomas 2013, Ndeinoma and Wiersum 2016). In 
Zimbabwe, diminished coordination, especially in communal areas, has led to widespread deforestation 
and habitat destruction in mopane woodlands (Ndlovu et al. 2019). Under such scenarios, coordination 
may be beneficial when led by the state, especially in communal areas in which traditional and customary 
rules have been eroded and remain weak. Exploring the governance of marula, Wynberg and Laird (2007) 
conclude that fit-for-purpose state interventions can be useful to address specific needs, in this case, 
strengthening adherence to traditional and customary rules. Ndeinoma and Wiersum (2016) observed that 
depending on the NTFP, legal protection of species may be necessary to ensure high adherence to statutory 
and customary rules.
Changes to land cover and the over-exploitation of mopane worms were common narratives across 
all tenurial regimes. However, perceptions of negative environmental change were more pronounced in 
communally managed areas, perhaps due to the multiple uses of mopane tree and pressures. This includes 
uses for energy, construction, medicinal uses, and settlement expansion in communal areas (Makhado et al. 
2014). Similar observations were made in Cameroon and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which 
the decline in edible caterpillar harvest yields was found to be driven by high-value timber species logging 
driven by forestry concessions (Noutcheu et al. 2016, Muvatsi et al. 2018).
5.3. Resource management interventions
Several factors contribute to weak mopane worm governance on communally managed lands (Shackleton 
2009, Thomas 2013). The high proportion of ‘free riders’ and the challenges of restricting access to the 
resource are likely to discourage local users from investing in expensive monitoring and enforcement 
activities (Cousins 1995, Ainslie 1999, Akpalu et al. 2009, Thomas 2013). Harvesters in communal areas 
see outsiders taking their resources without regard to customary norms and consequences. They are 
unlikely to incur the costs of self-organizing to protect their resources (or follow the rules themselves) 
when the problem seems intractable and they perceive little support from authorities. However, examples 
exist in other edible insect systems in which restrictive customary harvesting approaches have resulted 
in sustainable resource outcomes. In terms of customary norms, early instar harvesting was restricted in 
Gynanisa maja and Imbrasia zambesina in Zambia (Mbata et al. 2002), Hemijana variegate in South Africa 
(Egan 2013) and Encosternum delegorguei in Zimbabwe (Mawere 2014). Mawere (2014) concluded that 
local users in these systems restrict harvesting of juvenile instars and in some cases, avoid harvesting at 
particular times in the day. The ecological outcomes of these beliefs cannot be underestimated for resource 
conservation. Adhering to such customary beliefs inadvertently turned some users into activists who 
Sekonya et al: New Pressures, Old Foodways 149
protected their resources in communal areas. In the case of Encosternum delegorguei for example, Mawere 
(2014) observed that a strong bond between users and the resources was crucial for resource sustainability.
A lack of respect for local rules among outsiders has been commonly noted for mopane worm systems 
(Lucas 2011, Makhado et al. 2012, Sithole 2016), and other NTFPs (Twine et al. 2003). The unpredictability of 
the mopane worm harvest exacerbates this; since the size of the harvest varies greatly, the cost of managing 
the system to prevent ‘outsiders’ from extracting the resource may often be higher than the benefits received, 
further reducing the incentive to invest in management initiatives (Ostrom et al. 1999, Ostrom 2009).
Resource unpredictability does not have the same negative impact in private and public regimes because 
land managers have invested in access control systems such as fences and rangers for the protection of other, 
more valuable, and predictable resources, such as livestock or wildlife. These systems are repurposed for a 
few weeks of the year to provide income to land-owners or to build relationships through benefit-sharing 
programmes, and so mopane worm management is, in some sense, subsidized by other natural resource 
activities. Linked to a shift from livestock to wildlife management over the past decade (Cloete et al. 2007), 
landowners now want mopane worms on their land, as research has shown that defoliation of the mopane 
tree by herbivores can increase the nutritional quality of the second flush of leaves, creating better forage 
for wildlife mammals (Hartnett et al. 2012).
5.4. Overlapping mandates
As suggested by several authors (e.g. Shackleton 2009, Kozanayi et al., Makhado et al. 2012, Mwalukomo 
and Patel 2012) and confirmed in this study, overlapping mandates of tribal authorities and the provincial 
environmental department may cause confusion about who exactly is responsible for key resource 
management tasks. Often, the ambiguity which emanates from such institutional ‘layering’ tends to weaken 
local level resource management (Ainslie 1999, Makhado et al. 2012). In South Africa, this ambiguity, as 
well as a general weakening of common property systems in communally managed areas, stems in part 
from policies used by the apartheid regime to maintain social control over black communities in the former 
homelands by co-opting elites and chiefs. These policies served to dismantle rural people’s capacity for 
independent organization and governance, while the institutional order that was created, operated mainly 
as a covert mechanism for purposes of control from above, instead of meeting community needs (Cousins 
1995). For example, forced relocations that separated people from their traditional leaders and placed them 
under the rule of new leaders would have subverted the legitimacy of local institutions as tools for resource 
management. This led to the systematic dismantling of traditional governance systems, with implications 
for the communal area governance (Mwalukomo and Patel 2012). The effects of these historical geographies 
continue to have implications for natural resource use and governance in the modern day (Lahiff 2000, 
Claassens 2001, Twine et al. 2003, King 2007, Francis 2010). The growth of urban markets for mopane 
worms and the resulting high demand for the resource has added new pressures to the system, necessitating 
intensified systems of control where communal management systems once sufficed (Cousins 1995).
6. Conclusion
The findings provide evidence of the stark differences in governance systems and resource access across 
the three regimes. Overall, public, and private property regime managers demonstrated strong control 
over resource access, and the costs of controlling access to the mopane worm harvest were absorbed by 
pre-existing systems designed to manage other natural resources. In communally managed areas, there 
was an apparent breakdown in traditional governance systems, catalysed by significant social and political 
disruptions during apartheid, the legacy of which persists. Furthermore, the high costs of controlling 
access to unpredictable and wide-ranging mopane worm populations, increasing commercialization of 
the mopane worm resource and competing uses of the mopane tree undermine the effectiveness of this 
regime. Given the ongoing dysfunctionality of governance, the ability of the communal property regime in 
these areas to provide sustained access to mopane worm resources in the long term is thus doubtful. It may 
well be, however, that elsewhere in the region, communal areas provide a much higher level of control and 
functionality and thus provide a suitable governance regime for mopane worm regulation.
The degradation and decline of mopane worm resources pose a threat to the most marginalized harvesters, 
who lack the capital and social relationships necessary to maintain access through another system. Harvesters 
attempting to maintain access to mopane worm resources on tribal authority lands may increasingly be forced 
to negotiate access through other property rights regimes. A viable intervention could be to strengthen and 
invigorate traditional management systems and to develop an open dialogue between user groups, traditional 
authorities and local authorities. This could create a consensus regarding the customary rules that manage the 
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mopane worm harvest, and the roles each actor plays in supporting, monitoring and enforcing these rules as 
part of the local monitoring system. Such system could clarify who issues access permits, and harvest limits per 
household, and could maintain a register of permitted users and punishment for unauthorised access.
To increase the economic incentives for management, tribal authorities could co-manage land for both 
mopane wood and mopane worm resources. This might increase resource benefits while sharing management 
costs, providing an incentive to invest in management activities and strengthening local governance and 
participation of resource users. More research is needed to determine the impacts of harvesting and land 
cover change on populations of I. belina. The urgent need is to conduct systematic population surveys to 
corroborate or refute perceptions of resource users in this and other studies.
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